Research on incentive mechanism under multi-demand-side cooperation in logistics service supply chain

HU Renjie; ZHU Weiping; CHEN Yalan; HE Yuxiu

doi:10.12299/jsues.23-0121

Volume 37 Issue 3

Sep. 2023

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Article Navigation > Journal of Shanghai University of Engineering Science > 2023 > 37(3): 326-334

HU Renjie, ZHU Weiping, CHEN Yalan, HE Yuxiu. Research on incentive mechanism under multi-demand-side cooperation in logistics service supply chain[J]. Journal of Shanghai University of Engineering Science, 2023, 37(3): 326-334. doi: 10.12299/jsues.23-0121

Citation:

HU Renjie, ZHU Weiping, CHEN Yalan, HE Yuxiu. Research on incentive mechanism under multi-demand-side cooperation in logistics service supply chain[J]. Journal of Shanghai University of Engineering Science, 2023, 37(3): 326-334. doi: 10.12299/jsues.23-0121

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Research on incentive mechanism under multi-demand-side cooperation in logistics service supply chain

doi: 10.12299/jsues.23-0121

School of Air Transportation and School of Flying, Shanghai University of Engineering Science, Shanghai 201620, China

Received Date: 2022-06-21
Publish Date: 2023-09-30

Abstract

Abstract

Based on the theory of common agency, incentive models for sequential cooperation mechanisms and alliance cooperation mechanisms were constructed, and simulation analysis was conducted. Research result show that under the sequential cooperation mechanism, the logistics service demander signs contracts with the logistics service integrator, and the party who signs with the logistics service integrator first is likely to be at a disadvantage. Under the alliance cooperation mechanism, logistics service demanders sign contracts with logistics service integrators, and the upper limit of the optimal effort level provided by logistics service integrators is higher than the upper limit of the optimal effort level provided by them under the sequential cooperation mechanism.
- common agency,
- logistics service supply chain,
- incentive mechanism,
- information asymmetry

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References(13)

References

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